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In The Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. 
ROY LEE POE, 
Defendant and Appellant. 
Case No. 
11836 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from the conviction of the ap-
pellant, Roy Lee Poe, for murder in the first degree 
in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 76-30-3 (1953). 
DISPOSITION OF THE CASE IN THE 
LOWER COURT 
The appellant on the 20th day of May, 1969, was 
iound guilty by a jury of first degree murder in the 
Fifth Judicial District Court of Iron County, the Hon-
orable C. Nelson Day, Judge, presiding. The jury 
recommended leniency, and the appellant was 
sentenced to life imprisonment on the 22nd day of 
May, 1969. 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The respondent submits that the appellanr 
conviction should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The respondent agrees generally with the lac': 
as set out in appellant's summary of the evidenci 
The respondent does, however, wish to take issu; 
with some specific statements and add some fac'; 
which are important. 
On page 6 of the appellant's brief, the appe 
lant in the second full paragraph, is not making· 
statement of the facts, but is arguing his case. Tt.: 
statements are conclusory and reflect only the a: 
pellant's opinion as to what the district attorney di: 
Mr. Vern Phillips also testified that the appella: 
told him that he, Poe, had just killed somebody[ 
832). This took place on the 6th day of Novembe: 
1965, the same day that the victim was shot (T. 
In the prosecution's rebuttal, Mr. Delton Ra 
Nance testified that while in the Washington Coun:. 
Jait with the appellant, Mr. Poe told him that n 
went to Las Vegas in a station wagon (T. 1037). Nisl 
Mr. Cal Whitney testified that he did not go wit 
the appellant to Pete's Wagon Wheel or to Me: 
quite, Nevada (T. 1049) as a Mr. Dean Anderson he 
testified earlier (T. 904, 906). 
It is a critical fact that the appellant was n: 
given the death penalty, but rather was given lr 
imprisonment (Judgment on Verdict). 
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Other facts which are relevant are set out in de-
tail in the points of argument. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY REFUSING TO VOIRE DIRE THE JURY REGARD-
ING THEIR SPECIFIC RELIGIOUS DENOMINATIONS. 
During the selection of the jury members, 
counsel for the appellant requested that the Court 
voire dire each prospective juror to determine his 
specific religious denomination. This motion was 
made for the purpose of determining whether any 
of the prospective jurors had established a moral or 
religious attitude regarding capital punishment (T. 
64). The trial judge decided that it was not neces-
sary to ask each prospective juror what church they 
belonged to (T. 69). He did ask, however, whether 
any of the jurors had any "religious" or "moral" 
scruples with regard to the death penalty (T. 84). 
The court excused two jurors because they answer-
ed yes to the question of whether these scruples 
would cause them to be prejudiced one way or an-
other (T. 84-85). 
It should be noted at the outset of this argument 
that the appellant was not given the death penalty. 
The iury recommended leniency, and the trial 
court sentenced the appellant to life imprisonment. 
Uury Verdict; Judgment on Verdict.) This fact ren-
ders Point I of Appellant's Brief moot. Even assum-
ing that the court erred by its refusal to ask each 
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juror what his religion was, the appellant has nr 
been prejudiced in any way. He cannot now cla!:: 
that the court committed "prejudicial" error. 
"After hearing an appeal the court must 
give judgment without regard to errors or de-
fects which do not affect the substantial rights 
of the parties. If error has been committed, it 
shall not be presumed to have resulted in prej-
udice. The court must be satisfied that it has 
that effect before it is warranted in reversing 
the judgment." Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 
(1953). See also State v. Seymour, 18 Utah 2d 
153, 417 P.2d 655 (1966). 
The appellant has failed to show any prejudice 
he has not shown any defect or error whkh affecte: 
his substantial rights since the death penalty Wai 
never imposed upon him. 
The trial court did not commit error by refi;: 
ing to voire dire the jury regarding their sped· 
::-eligious denominations. In Witherspoon v. United Staff' 
391 U.S. 510 (1968), the defendant had been convic 
ed of murder in Illinois. An Illinois statute provided 
"In trials for murder it shall be a cause for 
challenge of any juror who shall, on being ex-
amined, state that he has conscientious scruples 
against capital punishment, or that he is opposed 
to the same." 391 U.S. at 512 (Emphasis 
added.) 
The Supreme Court ruled that the effect of 
statute was to stack the jury with those who wers 
not opposed to the death penalty. The imposition °· 
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the death penalty was reversed in Witherspoon. The 
Court said: 
" .. in its role as arbiter of the punish-
ment to be imposed, this jury fell woefully 
short of that impartiality to which the peti-
tioner was entitled under the Sixth and 
Fourteenth Amendment." 391 U.S. at 516. 
Under Utah law, a challenge for implied bias 
may be taken: 
"If the offense charged is punishable with 
death, the entertaining of such conscientious 
opinions as preclude [the Juror's] finding the 
defendant guilty, in which case he must neither 
be permitted nor compelled to serve as a juror." 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19 (9) (1953). (Em-
phasis added.) 
The Utah statute is easily distinguishable from 
the Illinois statute. Under the Utah law, mere con-
scientious scruples are not enough to challenge a 
prospective juror. The bias must be sufficiently 
strong so as to preclude the juror's finding the de-
fendant guilty. This standard is in harmony with 
the \'vitherspoon decision. In Witherspoon the court never 
did address itself to the issue of whether or not 
death-qualified jurors could be excused if their 
scruples would prohibit an impartial finding on the 
guilt-innocence issue. Witherspoon was limited only 
to the issue punishment. This is emphasized further 
by the fact that the Supreme Court affirmed the con-
viction and reversed only the death penalty. This 
Point alone is sufficient to distinguish Witherspoon. In 
6-
this case the appellant was not given the death pen-
alty, although he was convicted of first degree 
murder. This Court can affirm appellant's conviction 
without having to decide on the basis of Witherspoon 
The Nevada Supreme Court, however, has 
ruled on a statute identical to Utah Code Ann.§ 77-
30-19(9) (1953). In upholding the conviction the 
court made the following distinction: 
" ... the rationale of Witherspoon is m-
apposite to the Nevada statute since the statu-
tory purpose is to disqualify jurors whose 
opinions against the death penalty would pre-
clude their finding the defendant guilty. The 
Illinois statute considered in Witherspoon did 
not involve the right to challenge for cause 
those prospective jurors who stated that their 
reservations about capital punishment would 
prevent him from making an impartial de-
cision as to the defendant's guilt." Howard v. 
State, 446 P.2d 163, 165 (Nev. 1968). 
This position was confirmed in Barnes v. State, 450 P.2d 
150 (Nev. 1969). 
More recently, this Court has had the opportun· 
ity to compare Utah Code Ann. § 77-30-19(9) (1953) 
with Witherspoon. In State v. Kelbach, 23 Utah 2d 231, 
461 P.2d 297 (1969), the Utah Supreme Court adopted 
the exclusion of footnote 21 of the Witherspoon case. 
The Court quoted: 
" ... we repeat, however, that nothing we 
say today bears upon the power of a State to 
execute a defendant sentenced to death by a 
7 
jury from which the only veniremen who were 
in fact excluded for cause were those who made 
it unmistakably clear ( 1) that they would 
Automatically vote against the imposition of 
capital punishment without regard to any evi-
dence that might be developed at the trial of 
the case before them or (2) that their attitude 
toward the death penalty would prevent them 
from making an impartial decision as to the 
defendant's guilt." Id. at ________ , 461 P.2d at 303. 
The trial court committed no errors by refusing 
to voire dire the jury regarding their specific re-
ligious denominations, especially since the death 
penalty was not imposed. The specific denomina-
tion is not material. 
POINT IA 
THE TRIAL COURT ACCOMPLISHED THE OB-
JECTIVE OF DEFENSE COUNSEL IN VOIRE DIRE BY 
QUESTIONING THE JURY REGARDING THEIR RE-
LIGIOUS AND MORAL ATTITUDES AB 0 UT THE 
DEATH PENALTY. 
Although the trial judge did not ask each pros-
pective juror what his religion was, he did inquire 
whether any juror had "religious" or "moral" 
scruples about the death penalty (T. 84). The re-
spondent submits that this latter inquiry accomplish-
ed the defense counsel's objective to determine 
each juror's feelings on the death penalty. The fact 
that a prospective juror is Mormon, Catholic or Jew 
is not material. Whether one has religious or moral 
scruples about the death penalty is material. The 
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judge asked the only question that could have ac 
complished defense counsel's purpose. By know!nc 
that a prospective juror is Mormon does not mea! 
ipso facto that he is opposed to the death penalty 
On the other hand, by asking each juror specifica]. 
ly whether he has scruples, the court anc 
attorneys can then make a determination as 'c 
whether these scruples will prejudice the prospec 
tive juror. Unless a veniremen states unambiguous· 
ly that he would automatically vote for or 
the imposition of capital punishment no matter wha 
the trial might reveal, it cannot be assumed tha1• 
this is his position. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. srn 
(1968). Because a person is Mormon, it cannot be 
assumed that he would vote for the death penalty. 
It is not necessary that veniremen be asked their 
specific religion; in fact, the question accomplishes 
nothing. The judge committed no errors, but rather 
avoided error by refusing to voire dire about spe 
cific religions. The defense counsel's objective WaB 
accomplished, and he cannot now claim error. II 
is also significant here that no death penalty was 
imposed. 
POINT II 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT PREJU· 
DICIAL ERROR IN THE MANNER OF SELECTING 
THE ADDITIONAL JURORS. 
Before answering this argument, it should be 
pointed out by the respondent that none of the six 
additional prospective jurors summoned by Judge 
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Day were on the jury which rendered the guilty 
verdict. Only one was called as an alternate (T. 128) 
but he was not needed and was excused before the 
jury deliberated (T. 1063). Even assuming that the 
judge committed error in the manner of selecting 
the additional prospective jurors, no prejudice re-
sulted to the appellant. The appellant has not chal-
lenged the manner of selecting the jury which ac-
tually found him guilty. It must be presumed that 
this selection was correct and in accordance with 
the Utah Statute governing selection. Utah Code 
Ann.§ 78-46-23 (1953); State v. Moore, 111Utah458, 183 
P.2d 973 (1947). 
It should be p o int e d out, furthermore, 
that these additional jurors were summoned only 
for the purpose of selecting one additional juror for 
purposes of allowing ten preemptory challenges 
for each side (T. 91). There were only 31 jurors in 
the box and one more was needed to allow the pre-
emptory challenges (T. 91 ). The six were also select-
ed for the purpose of selecting one alternate juror 
(T. 91). After the jury had been selected, not one 
of the additional six were on the panel (T. 110). Only 
one was selected as an alternate (T. 128). There is 
nothing in this result which could have prejudiced 
the appellant. The jury which determined the ap-
pellant's guilt was a "body truly representative of 
the community." Glasser v. United States, 315 U.S. 60, 
86 0941). Even assuming that the court was in error 
to select persons from the small community of Paro-
wan, the result was still that the jury finally selected 
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was "drawn from the cross-section of the commu: 
ity." State v. Dodge, 12 Utah 2d 293, 365 P.2d 798 09oi 
In criminal cases, where the venire of the )urcr: 
summoned for term has been exhausted, and ili: 
court directs additional names to be drawn from fu, 
box, names of jurors not readily accessible becaui: 
residing at a distance may be properly laid asiaf 
and other names drawn. State v. Cluj I' 48 Utah m 
158 Pac. 701 (1916). 
The implication of his holding is that jurors maj 
be selected from the immediate surrounding are: 
of the court. Other names may be drawn until 
not "at a distance" are found. This is in accord wifr 
the Utah Statute. 
"If during any term of a district court any 
additional ... trial jurors shall be drawn from 
the said box by the sheriff or his deputy in 
open court; but if in the judgment of the court 
the attendance of any drawn cannot be obtained 
within a reasonable time, they may be laid aside 
and other names may be drawn in their place 
and in the same manner. If all names become 
exhausted at any term, the judge may order 
an open venire for such number of jurors as 
he deems necessary, who shall be summoned 
to serve." Utah Code Ann. § 78-46-23 (1953). 
(Emphasis added.) 
In this case Judge Day determined that because 
of the time involved, it was more expedient to sum-
mon the additional jurors rather than take the time 
to draw out names when the result would be the 
11 
same, i.e., the additional prospective jurors would 
be from the surrounding area regardless of the man-
ner in which they were selected. Those names 
drawn which could not be summoned within a 
reasonable time, would have been drawn until those 
not at a distance could be summoned. It is more ex-
pedient in the interest of time and because of the 
circumstances, i.e., only one additional juror was 
needed, for the judge to summon the jurors direct-
ly. The trial court committed no error, and the ap-
pellant was not prejudiced in any way. 
POINT III 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY ADMITTING CERTAIN TEST IM 0 NY OF THE 
PRIOR TRIAL TO BE READ TO THE JURY. 
Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-3 (1953) provides: 
"Whenever in any court of record the testi-
mony of any witness in any criminal case shall 
be stenographically reported by an official 
court reporter, and thereafter such witness 
shall die or be beyond the jurisdiction of the 
court in which the cause is pending, either 
party to the action may read in evidence the 
testimony of such witness, when duly certified 
by the reporter to be correct, in any subsequent 
trial of, or proceeding had in the same cause, 
subject only to the same objections that might 
be made, if such witnesses were upon the stand 
and testifying in open court." 
This statute is clear that, in Utah, testimony of prior 
trials may be read at a subsequent hearing where 
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it is determined that the witness is outside the juris-
diction of the court. 
The appellant cites State v. Kazda, 15 Utah 2d 313. 
392 P.2d 486 (1964), for the proposition that there 
must be a showing that the witness "is in fact be-
yond the jurisdiction of the court." (Appellant's 
Brief p. 15). Kazda does not contain such a proviso. 
Nothing in Kazda goes to the effort or degree of prool 
that one must show before the court will allow test!· 
mony from a prior trial to be read in a subsequenl 
hearing on the same cause. Respondent submits 
that this assertion is false and not based on the Kazda 
case. The Court held only that "A witness outside 
of the state is 'beyond the jurisdiction of the court.'" 
15 Utah 2d at 316, 392 P.2d at 488. 
The general common law rule is, that, if due 
diligence to locate a witness has been exerted, and 
the witness cannot be located, then testimony from 
a prior trial can be read at a subsequent hearing. 
Oklahoma Alcoholic Beverage Control B o a r d v. Lobo, 
391 P.2d 819 (Okl. 1964); Bird v. State, 362 P.2d 117 
(Okl. Cr. 1961). 
"Where the accused at a former trial or at 
a preliminary hearing once enjoyed his right to 
be confronted by a witness against him and had 
the privilege of cross-examinating the witness, 
if at a subsequent trial, involving the same is-
sue, it satisfactorily appears that . . . his 
[witness'] presence with due diligence cannot 
be had, ... or where his whereabouts cannot 
with due diligence be ascertained, a transcript 
of the testimony of such witness may be intro-
13 
duced as the evidence of such absent witness." 
391 P.2d at 821. 
The respondent asks this court to adopt this standard 
of due diligence and hold that the prosecution did 
with due diligence attempt to locate both Louis P. 
Lagana and Mary Miner; and that the trial court did 
not err in allowing their written testimony to be read 
at the second trial (T. 804, 821). 
Both Louis Lagana and Mary Miner testified at 
the first trial and both were cross examined, or at 
least defense counsel had an opportunity to 
cross exam (T. 173). The court reporter also testified 
that the prior testimony of Mr. Lagana and Mrs. 
Miner was accurately reported (T. 803), State v. Leg-
groan, 15 Utah 2d 153, 389 P.2d 142 (1964). The defense 
counsel, furthermore, stipulated to the above (T. 802-
803). 
Harry E. McCoy testified that he had subpoenas 
for both Lagana and Miner (T. 163; 167). Mr. Lagana 
could not be located in Utah or Nevada (T. 167). Mr. 
McCoy testified that Mrs. Miner could not be lo-
cated in Utah or Nevada. Mr. McCoy went to Nevada 
for the purpose of locating the witnesses and serv-
ing them with subpoenas (T. 167; 170). Since a per-
son outside the state is not in the jurisdiction of the 
court, State i'. Kazda, supra, the efforts of Mr. McCoy 
were more than "due diligence" within the mean-
i11g of the common law rule. 
Phillip Lang Fore m aster , the Washington 
County Attorney, testified that he prepared the sub-
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poenas for Mr. Lagana and Mary Miner (T. 729). He 
testified that to the best of his knowledge Mary 
Miner was in New York (T. 730). 
Clark Robison, a deputy sheriff of Clark County, 
Nevada, testified that Mary Miner had lived in 
Mesquite, Nevada, but was not living there at the 
time he attempted to contact her (T. 744). To the bes\ 
of his knowledge, Mary Miner lived in Eastern 
United States (T. 745). He concluded that she was 
not available for service of process (T. 7 45). He also 
testiied that he could not locate Mr. Lagana for serv-
ice of the subpoena (T. 748). 
Mr. McCoy was again called to testify (T. 750). 
He testified that Mr. Lagana had taken employmen! 
in the Midwest somewhere with the Atchison and 
Santa Fe Railroad (T. 754). He received this infor· 
mation from Mr. Lagana' s previous employer (T. 
753). 
Sheriff Evan Whitehead, Sheriff of Washington 
County, Utah, checked the Utah directories for Mr. 
Lagana and Mrs. Miner (T. 761, 764). He also checked 
with every sheriff in every Utah county. Each de-
partment checked their directories and were un· 
able to locate Lagana or Miner (T. 792-795). There 
were no vehicles registered to either Mr. Lagana 
or Mrs. Miner or to the husband of Mary Miner (T. 
795-797). 
It was only after this showing of due diligence 
that the trial judge admitted the previous testimony 
(T. 799; 821). The court did not commit error by its 
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determination that a diligent effort was made to lo-
cate Louis P. Lagana and Mary Miner. As far as the 
judge was concerned the witnesses were out of the 
jurisdiction of the court and could not be served. 
The requirements of Utah Code Ann. § 77-44-3 (1953) 
were met, and the previous testimony was properly 
admitted at the second trial. 
POINT IV 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY ALLOWING CERTAIN PICTURES TO BE ADMIT-
TED INTO EVIDENCE. 
The appellant is challenging the admissibility 
of exhibits 8 and 9. Said exhibits were black and 
white pictures of the deceased taken before the vic-
tim was removed from the scene of the murder (T. 
199). 
It is a matter of discretion with the trial judge to 
determine whether the probative value of a picture 
outweighs the possible adverse effects which the 
pictures may have upon the jury. State v. Renzo, 21 
Utah 2d 205, 443 P.2d 392 (1968). "This discretion on 
the part of a trial judge ... should not be interfered 
with by an appellate court unless manifest error is 
shown." Id. at 215, 443 P.2d at 299. State v. Poe, 15 Utah 
2d 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968). The trial court judge did 
not abuse its discretion by admitting exhibits 8 and 
9. 
The state had the burden of showing beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the appellant was guilty of 
first degree murder. The elements of first degree 
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murder include a showing of "wilful, delibera16 
malicious and premeditated killing; ... " Utah Codt 
Ann. § 76-30-3 ( 1953). The pictures, admitted in evi 
dence, were offered to show malice and premedila· 
tion, etc. By showing that the victim was 
when he was shot, it eliminates any doubt but tho: 
there was a wilful and deliberate killing. Such pro 
bative value clearly outweighs the fact that the pie 
tures may have been offensive to some. 
In State v. Russell, 106 Utah 116, 145 P.2d lQQj 
0944), the Utah Supreme Court said: 
". . . The pictures of the deceased taken 
after her death and showing her wounds, were 
clearly admissible. Even though the defendant 
did admit the killing, he did not admit the in-
tent to kill and the nature of the wounds may 
be material on that point. The pictures showed 
the nature of the wounds more clearly than the 
testimony of witnesses could." Id. at 133, 145 
P.2d at 1010. 
Also in State v. Renzo, supra, pictures of the victim, for 
whose death the defendant was charged with first 
degree murder, disclosing in color the bruised con· 
dition of the victim's body and perforations ol 
walls of the victim's vagina, offered to show a de· 
praved mind on the part of the defendant, were 
properly admitted into evidence. 
These cases support the trial judge's determina· 
tion that exhibits 8 and 9 had probative value to 
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show intent. The court did not err by admitting them 
into evidence. No manifest error has been shown 
and this court should not interfer with Judge Day's 
discretion. 
The appellant's reliance on State v. Poe, supra, is 
without proper foundation. In Poe these same two 
pictures were offered and admitted into evidence. 
21 Utah 2d at 117, 441 P.2d at 514. The Court did not 
hold that the admission of these black and white 
photographs was error. Rather, the court said that 
the trial judge abused its discretion by admitting 
colored slides into evidence and permitting them 
to be shown to the jury. Id. Also the court made its 
decision on the fact that the death penalty was im· 
posed. Id. Since no death penalty was imposed at 
the second trial, the appellant cannot say that the 
pictures influenced the jury to impose the death pen-
alty. 
The probative value of the pictures, i.e., to show 
a wilful, deliberate, malicious and premeditated kill-
ing, outweighed any possible adverse effects which 
the pictures may have had upon the jury. There was 
no error and appellant's conviction should be af-
firmed. 
POINT V 
THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT COMMIT ERROR 
BY REQUIRING THE JURY TO RETIRE AND DELIB-
ERATE AT A LATE HOUR. 
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The Utah Supreme Court has said that trh 
judge has the final responsibility for conducting thf 
trial, and he should be allowed "considerable lat; 
tude of discretion with respect to the mechanics c: 
procedure; and his rulings must be sustained unles1 
he has acted in some manner which is clearly arb1 
trary and unreasonable and to the prejudice of the 
objecting party." Hanks v. Christensen, 11 Utah 2d 
11, 354 P.2d 564, 566 ( 1960). The decision of the tr!a: 
judge was not arbitrary and unreasonable, and the 
appellant has failed to show how he was prejudiced 
In Xenakis v. Garrett Freight Lines, 1 Utah 2d 299. 
265 P.2d 1007 (1954), the Court said that it is within 
the sound discretion of the trial court to determine 
at what time the jury should deliberate. The cour! 
cautions against unreasonable exercise of that dis 
cretion and says that the rights of both parties 
should be safeguarded. The trial judge in Xena!V1 
did not abuse his discretion by causing the jury to 
deliberate at a late hour. 
"Should it be assumed that he did so, it 
does not necessarily follow that such procedure 
adversely affected the plaintiffs." Id. at 307, 
265 P.2d at 1012. 
Judge Day did not abuse his discretion by al· 
lowing the jury to deliberate at a late hour. The ap-
pellant has assumed that only he was prejudiced 
Both parties were effected equally by the judge's 
decision. The appellant cannot assume that the jury 
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would find him guilty just because they deliberated 
at a late hour. 
Furthermore, Judge Day based his decision on 
the fact that the jury had only heard one hour and 
twenty minutes of testimony in the morning and 
only two hours in the afternoon (T. 1059-1060). The 
jury had had a weekend to recover and rest (T. 1060). 
They retired to consider the verdict at 7:38 p.m. (T. 
1063). They reached their verdict at 3: 10 a.m. (T. 
1070). There was no abuse of discretion, and the trial 
judge did not act arbitrarily and unreasonably as 
evidenced by the above facts. More prejudicial ef-
fects could have resulted if the trial judge had in-
terupted the jury's deliberation. The court did not 
commit error; rather, it avoided error. 
POINT VI 
THE APPELLANT WAS GIVEN A FAIR AND IM-
PARTIAL TRIAL. 
None of the errors claimed by the appellant 
were committed. The trial judge took precautions to 
insure a fair and impartial trial. The appellant, more-
over, has not been able to show that he was preju-
diced in any way. This Court must presume that a 
fair trial was held, and it cannot reverse for mere 
technicalities. Utah Code Ann. § 77-42-1 (1953). 
CONCLUSION 
The respondent asks this court to affirm Mr. 
Poe's conviction of murder in the first degree and 
21J 
hold that the trial court did not commit any prejud. 
cial errors. 
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